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Error as Means to Discovery*
Kevin Elliottyz

This paper argues, first, that recent studies of experimentation, most notably by Deborah
Mayo, provide the conceptual resources to describe scientific discovery’s early stages as
error-probing processes. Second, it shows that this description yields greater understanding
of those early stages, including the challenges that they pose, the research strategies associated with them, and their influence on the rest of the discovery process. Throughout, the
paper examines the phenomenon of ‘‘chemical hormesis’’ (i.e., anomalous low-dose effects
from toxic chemicals) as a case study that is important not only for the biological sciences
but also for contemporary public policy. The resulting analysis is significant for at least two
reasons. First, by elucidating the importance of discovery’s earliest stages, it expands previous accounts by philosophers such as William Wimsatt and Lindley Darden. Second, it
identifies the discovery process as yet another philosophical topic on which the detailed
studies of the ‘‘new experimentalists’’ can shed new light.

1. Introduction. Scientific anomaly plays a crucial role in classic accounts
of scientific reasoning, theory change, and discovery (e.g., Hanson 1958,
1961; Popper 1959; Kuhn 1970; Lakatos 1970; Laudan 1977; Shapere
1977). Several philosophers (e.g., Hon 1989; Mayo 1996; Allchin 2001)
have recently begun to extend these traditional studies by exploring how
scientists isolate the specific errors associated with anomalies.1 This
concern with scientific error flows, at least in part, from a recent emphasis
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1. The paper follows Allchin (2001, 38) in using ‘error’ to refer to ‘‘any mistaken conclusion or unintended outcome in science or technology.’’ Thus, anomalies plausibly qualify
as instances of error (i.e., as unintended outcomes), but anomalies also indicate that further
errors (i.e., mistaken conclusions) must be present in order to produce the inconsistency or
inexplicability between ‘‘fact’’ and theory that constitute the anomalies.
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in science studies on the details of scientists’ experimental practices (e.g.,
Hacking 1983; Franklin 1986, 1997; Galison 1987; Mayo 1996).
According to Deborah Mayo, for example, scientific experimentation is
fundamentally a matter of testing for error and eliminating it. With regard
to scientific anomaly in particular, Mayo claims that scientists perform
experimental tests in order to probe for the specific errors associated with
each anomaly (1996, 55). Allchin (2001, 53) also emphasizes that scientific anomalies reveal the presence of errors, and he provides a typology of
error types that can help researchers to probe for the specific error that is
present in each instance of anomaly.
This paper’s thesis is that these recent studies of scientific error provide
the conceptual resources to describe the earliest stages of scientific discovery as error-probing processes and that this description yields greater
understanding of the entire course of discovery. Previous influential
accounts of discovery (e.g., Wimsatt 1987; Darden 1991; Schaffner 1993)
suggest that scientific inquiry often occurs via what Nickles (1996, 1997)
calls a ‘‘multi-pass’’ progression, in which researchers gradually refine
models and theories, frequently in response to anomalies. Nevertheless,
these accounts have not focused much attention on the earliest stages of
this process, in which scientists initially attempt to characterize the
anomalies that they later try to eliminate. The current paper attempts to
shed new light on these early stages by describing them as processes by
which researchers probe anomalies for error. Specifically, it examines
how researchers are probing for the errors associated with a contemporary
biological anomaly called ‘‘chemical hormesis.’’ It argues that the case
study highlights the challenges posed by these early error-probing stages,
the strategies with which researchers approach them, and their influence
on the rest of the discovery process.
Section 2 discusses how the early stages of scientific discovery could
be described as processes of probing anomalies for error. The next section
illustrates this suggestion using the case study of chemical hormesis.
Section 4 then argues, on the basis of the case study, that the entire
discovery process can be illuminated by describing its earliest stages as
error-probing processes. The paper is important for at least two reasons.
First, it provides a more detailed description of scientific discovery’s
earliest stages, which have not been emphasized in recent descriptions of
discovery (e.g., Wimsatt 1987; Darden 1991; Bechtel and Richardson
1993; Schaffner 1993; Nickles 1997). Second, it shows how the study of
error can enrich the philosophical literature on scientific discovery. Both
Mayo (1996, 51) and Allchin (2001) suggest that their work should be
relevant for understanding the discovery process, but they have not explored this suggestion in detail. Thus, the paper constitutes an example
of fruitfully integrating recent approaches to science studies (namely,
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detailed studies of scientific experimentation) with a more traditional
topic in the philosophy of science (i.e., scientific discovery).
2. Error Probing and the Early Stages of Discovery. This section of the
paper argues, first, that recent studies of scientific discovery do not describe its earliest stages in detail. It then shows how Mayo’s examination
of scientific error provides the conceptual resources to describe those
early stages as error-probing processes. As an example of recent philosophical work on discovery, the paper employs the studies of William
Wimsatt (1987) and Lindley Darden (1991, 1992). Their work is chosen
for at least four reasons: (1) it is influential, (2) it elucidates the role of
anomaly in discovery, (3) it is broadly representative of other recent
studies of discovery (e.g., Bechtel and Richardson 1993; Schaffner 1993;
Nickles 1997), and (4) Darden’s work in particular describes discovery’s
earliest stages in as much or more detail than any other previous account.
In Wimsatt’s article ‘‘False Models as Means to Truer Theories’’
(1987), he argues that false models can play an important role in the
development of scientific knowledge. He begins by noting that a model
can be false in a number of ways: (1) by having only local applicability,
(2) by being an idealization, (3) by being incomplete, (4) by misdescribing the interactions of variables, (5) by giving a totally ‘‘wrongheaded’’ picture of nature, (6) by giving purely phenomenological
descriptions, or (7) by simply failing to describe or predict data (Wimsatt
1987, 28–29). Scientists obviously would prefer to have true models
rather than false ones, but they don’t usually have a choice in the matter;
therefore, Wimsatt emphasizes that false models (especially ones that
involve idealization or incompleteness) can frequently be of great value.
He provides an extensive list of functions that such models might play in
the search for better ones, including: (1) serving as a starting point for a
series of more complex models, (2) suggesting new tests or refinements of
established models, (3) serving as templates that account for large-scale
effects and that make smaller effects noticeable, (4) serving as limiting
cases that are true under certain conditions, (5) defining extreme cases
between which all other cases lie, and (6) providing a simple arena for
determining some properties of a system (1987, 30–31).
Wimsatt illustrates many of these functions with specific cases from
the development of chromosomal mechanics by the Morgan School
during the early part of the twentieth century. These examples clarify that,
although Wimsatt does not explicitly state that anomalies are central to the
early stages of discovery, they play a critical role in his account. For
example, because Gregor Mendel’s model for inheritance predicted that
all genetic factors should be inherited either always independently or (as
in the case of pleiotropic factors) always together, the existence of
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‘‘linked’’ factors that were sometimes inherited together ‘‘stood out’’ to
researchers as a significant anomaly. This anomaly (i.e., linked factors)
provided crucial inspiration for Sturtevant and Morgan to develop their
more complex ‘‘linear linkage’’ model of genes on chromosomes (1987,
32). Then, when anomalous recombination frequencies systematically
violated predictions of the linear-linkage model (in particular, the
prediction that recombination frequencies would be additive), this violation indicated that the model was failing to take account of another
causal factor (namely, double crossovers) (1987, 34–35). Finally, the
less-than-predicted frequency of double crossovers between factors in
close proximity helped to suggest particular hypotheses to Muller and
Haldane about the mechanical features (such as rigidity and torsional
strength) of the chromosomes upon which the genetic factors were
located (1987, 36). Thus, according to Wimsatt, scientific discovery is
largely the result of false models’ giving rise to anomalous experimental
results that stimulate the development of more sophisticated models
and theories.
Lindley Darden’s book Theory Change in Science (1991) provides a
more comprehensive account of discovery, but it independently develops
a very similar conclusion to that provided by Wimsatt. She argues that the
growth of scientific knowledge is largely the product of gradual adjustments to previous theories in response to anomalies. Based on her analysis of the history of Mendelian genetics, she suggests five steps by which
researchers change theories in response to anomalies: (1) they confirm the
existence of the anomaly; (2) they localize the anomaly; (3) they change
the theory by altering (e.g., deleting, generalizing, or complicating) a
theoretical component or adding a new component; (4) they assess the
new version of the theory (using criteria from the second set of strategies); and (5) (if the preceding four steps fail to resolve the anomaly) they
consider whether the anomaly is so significant that it requires abandonment of the entire current theory or whether the anomaly can be set aside
for a time (1991, 269).
Neither Wimsatt nor Darden provide much elaboration of the first two
steps of this discovery process that Darden describes, however. With
regard to the first step (i.e., ‘‘confirming’’ the anomaly), Darden claims:
Before efforts are made to resolve an anomaly, the correctness of the
anomalous data needs to be confirmed. Repeating experiments is one
way to verify the existence of an anomaly. . . . The gene case [discussed throughout the book] provided few instances of a purported
anomaly being explained away as based on faulty data. Presumably
many such instances were never published in the scientific literature;
scientists corrected them before publishing. (1991, 271)

178

kevin elliott

Besides this suggestion that scientists can repeat experiments, Darden
does not offer many further suggestions for the ‘‘confirmation’’ of
anomalous data (see e.g., 1991, 271; 1992, 257–258). As she intimates,
her case study did not lend itself to an investigation of the reasoning
strategies by which scientists confirm that an anomaly is occurring.
Darden provides somewhat more detail concerning her second stage of
discovery, the attempt to localize the source of an anomaly within one
component of a theory (1991, 271). Specifically, she distinguishes monster anomalies from model anomalies. She claims that monster anomalies
are those that can be localized in such a way that they do not pose a
problem for any component of a particular theory, either because the
cause of the anomaly is outside the scope of the theory’s domain or
because the anomaly is a rare, atypical phenomenon (1992, 258). In
contrast, she describes anomalies that cannot be localized outside the
domain of the theory as model anomalies, which require changes in some
theory component. Nevertheless, her analysis of anomaly localization still
leaves room for much further elaboration, because her account starts with
researchers analyzing the relationship between an anomaly and one
particular theory. Because some anomalies could be problematic with
respect to a number of different theories or auxiliary hypotheses, a
complete account of anomaly localization would ultimately need to describe how researchers identify one particular theory as problematic. For
example, anomalous measurements of neutrino flux in the 1960’s could
have signaled a problem with theories from a wide variety of disciplines,
including nuclear physics, astrophysics, neutrino physics, or radiochemistry (Collins and Pinch 1993).
Wimsatt’s paper also fails to examine in detail these first two stages of
scientific discovery (i.e., anomaly confirmation and anomaly localization). His goal was not to examine the initial steps by which scientists
characterize an anomaly. Instead, he focuses on Darden’s third step (i.e.,
theory revision), in which scientists change false models in response to
anomalies that scientists have already ‘‘confirmed’’ and ‘‘localized.’’
Nevertheless, careful attention to Wimsatt’s own examples supports the
importance of these initial steps. For example, a series of experiments and
debates were necessary before the errors associated with the anomaly of
non-independent assortment were clarified sufficiently so that Morgan and
Sturtevant could postulate their chromosomal linkage model as a response
to the anomaly. Initially, researchers had to consider the possibility that
their anomalous data were invalid results of questionable experimentation. Thus, they had to ‘‘confirm’’ that the anomaly was a replicable
phenomenon before they considered alterations to current theory. Furthermore, even if the anomaly represented a generalizable phenomenon, it
could have been either (1) an example of typical patterns of inheritance
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(thus indicating that Mendelian genetic theory might have to be abandoned or radically altered), (2) a mysterious phenomenon that would have
to be temporarily ignored, or (3) (as Morgan and Sturtevant were able to
view it) a specific, localizable error in the former theory. The anomaly
served as a valuable instigation for theory alteration only because Morgan
and Sturtevant ‘‘localized’’ the anomaly as a specific error (namely,
overgeneralizing the phenomenon of independent assortment). Thus, the
initial stages of characterizing an anomaly (which Darden describes as
anomaly ‘‘confirmation’’ and ‘‘localization’’), although not discussed by
Wimsatt and not fully explored by Darden, appear to play an important
preliminary role in the discovery process.
This paper argues that Deborah Mayo’s study of experimental error in
Error and the Growth of Experimental Knowledge (1996) provides conceptual resources for extending Wimsatt’s and Darden’s preliminary
descriptions of discovery’s early stages. In particular, a central thesis of her
book is that scientific experimentation is designed to ‘‘probe’’ for potential
errors in scientific hypotheses. For example, she identifies four standard,
or ‘‘canonical,’’ errors that pervade most areas of scientific practice: (1)
mistaking chance effects or spurious correlations for genuine regularities,
(2) mistakes about the quantity or value of a parameter, (3) mistakes about
a causal factor, and (4) mistakes about experimental assumptions (1996,
449). She claims that scientific experimentation is designed to provide
‘‘severe tests’’ that identify these canonical errors (and other errors that are
specific to particular domains of inquiry) when they are present.
With regard to anomalies in particular, Mayo claims that experimentation serves as a probe for the specific error that is responsible for
anomalous results (1996, 147–148). This sort of probing is important
because, as Mayo emphasizes, an anomalous result can signal not only a
problem with a high-level theory but also a wide variety of more mundane
difficulties. For example, because experimental data are often the result of
extensive interpretation, the anomalous data themselves might be the
result of experimental error (Mayo 1996, 128 ff.; see also Ackermann
1985; Hacking 1988). In other words, anomalous data might turn out to
be the artifact of particular experimental procedures, or they might be the
result of misguided interpretations of low-level experimental results.
Therefore, researchers who encounter an anomalous result may not be
sure precisely what error is responsible for the anomaly; it could be a
fluke result, an experimental error, an instance of flawed auxiliary hypotheses, or an error in one or more current reigning theories. In order to
isolate the specific locus of difficulty, Mayo advocates ‘‘error probing,’’
including the design of separate severe tests for the multiple auxiliary
hypotheses associated with anomalous experiments (see also Allchin
2001).
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Mayo’s notion of error probing arguably facilitates a richer description
of what occurs in the early stages of discovery (i.e., anomaly ‘‘confirmation’’ and anomaly ‘‘localization’’). Darden characterized anomaly
‘‘confirmation’’ very briefly, claiming that it consists in showing anomalous data to be correct. Based on Mayo’s ‘‘error-based’’ account of
scientific practice, one might further characterize anomaly confirmation as
the process of eliminating a variety of errors. These errors might include:
(1) accepting an experimental artifact as a genuine phenomenon, (2)
making an experimental mistake (e.g., with instrumentation or calculations), (3) accepting a fluke result as a generalizable phenomenon, (4)
making an unwarranted statistical interpretation of experimental data, and
(5) producing experimental data through fraudulent techniques (see, e.g.,
Star and Gerson 1986).
Similarly, one might develop Darden’s description of anomaly localization more extensively by characterizing it as the process of
probing for the locus of error in one or more experiments. Darden
described anomaly localization as the process of either shifting an
anomaly outside a primary theory’s domain or identifying a particular
theory component as problematic. Based on the notion of error probing,
one might include the following activities as elements of anomaly localization: (1) identifying particular theory components (as opposed to
other components of a theory) as either plausible or unlikely loci of
error, (2) identifying particular theories (as opposed to other theories) as
either plausible or unlikely loci of error, and (3) identifying particular
auxiliary hypotheses as either plausible or unlikely loci of error. Describing anomaly characterization and localization in this way (i.e., as
processes of eliminating error and probing for the locus of error) does
not conflict with Darden’s earlier descriptions of these processes. It
merely provides added detail concerning what they involve, and it
highlights studies of error as a source of insights concerning the confirmation and localization processes. Thus, by exploring in greater detail
both the sorts of errors that may be associated with scientific anomalies
and the process of probing these anomalies for error, one can plausibly
enrich previous accounts of scientific discovery’s early stages. The rest
of this paper illustrates this error-probing process in a case study that is
of great significance for contemporary biological science and public
policy.
3. Chemical Hormesis: A Case Study of Anomaly and Error. This third
section describes the error-probing process in the case of a contemporary
biological anomaly called ‘‘chemical hormesis.’’ For over 50 years,
toxicologists in the United States have been attempting to establish
standards for safe human exposure to hazardous substances. For most
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substances, scientists have assumed the existence of threshold doses. In
other words, they claim that some dose level exists below which a substance ceases to be toxic. This assumption fits well with the notion that
organisms have adaptive capabilities that enable them to respond effectively to low levels of environmental stressors. According to some models
of carcinogenesis, however, even one molecule of a carcinogen increases
cancer risk. If such models were correct, this would imply that no
threshold dose level exists, at least for carcinogens. Therefore, it is not
intuitively clear whether scientists should predict the effects of toxins
using models with a threshold or models without a threshold. Unfortunately, it is not easy to resolve experimentally this issue of the low-dose
effects of toxins, because low-dose effects are usually quite small, they are
difficult to measure with statistical significance, and they require large
sample sizes. At present, federal agencies such as the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA), and the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) employ
threshold models for estimating the low-dose effects of most toxins, but
they employ linear, no-threshold models for carcinogens (National Research Council 1994, 31).
Because of the difficulties involved in measuring low-dose chemical
effects, the extrapolation of the effects of toxic and carcinogenic chemicals at high doses down to their effects at very low doses continues to be
a matter of dispute between the medical, environmental, industrial, and
military communities. On the one hand, recent research has associated
very low doses of some chemicals, especially chemicals that ‘‘mimic’’
hormones such as estrogen, with phenomena such as reproductive cancer,
low sperm counts in male organisms, alteration of immune function, and
decline in species populations. (See e.g., Birnbaum 1994; Colborn,
Dumanoski, and Myers 1996; Krimsky 2000, NRC 2000.) This supports
the notion that some toxic chemicals may have extremely low thresholds,
or no thresholds at all. On the other hand, Edward Calabrese, an influential toxicologist working at the University of Massachusetts, Amherst,
claims to have found extensive evidence for a phenomenon called
‘‘hormesis,’’ in which very low doses of toxic chemicals or radiation may
produce an effect that is the opposite of the effect that the chemicals or the
radiation produce at higher doses (Calabrese and Baldwin 1997, 1998,
1999, 2003).2 This phenomenon results in a U-shaped dose-response
2. Calabrese is the chairman of the Biological Effects of Low Level Exposures advisory
board, a group of scientists organized to develop a better understanding of biological
responses to low doses of chemical and physical agents. He is editor of the journal Biological Effects of Low Level Exposures, he has organized several conferences related to the
hypothesis of hormesis, and he recently published a summary of the hormesis hypothesis in
the journal Nature (Calabrese and Baldwin 2003).
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Figure 1. Examples of the general form of hormetic dose-response relationships. The
bottom curve could represent the relationship between alcohol intake and human mortality,
whereas the top curve could represent a hormetic relationship between dose of a growth
inhibitor and plant growth.)

curve that displays a threshold below which a toxic chemical has either no
effects or perhaps even beneficial effects (see Figure 1).
The dose-response curve for hormetic chemicals is U-shaped, because
their biological effects equal control levels at dosages close to zero, their
effects drop below control levels as their dosages increase, and then their
effects appear to reverse and rise above control levels as the dosages
increase further. These U-shaped curves can also be inverted, thus representing low-dose effects that rise above the level of controls and highdose effects that reverse and drop below controls (see the top curve in
Figure 1). A familiar example of this sort of dose-response is the effect of
alcohol on human mortality. Low levels of alcohol consumption decrease
human mortality rates below control levels. Nevertheless, high levels of
alcohol consumption increase human mortality rates above control levels.
Many other examples of chemical hormesis are more counter-intuitive
than the case of alcohol. For example, some evidence exists that plant
growth inhibitors may actually increase plant growth when the inhibiting
chemicals are present at extremely low levels (Calabrese 1999). Similarly,
very low levels of insecticides that are supposed to inhibit reproduction
may actually stimulate reproduction (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998)!
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Calabrese and Baldwin recently completed two of the most thorough
examinations of the evidence for chemical hormesis to date (1997, 2001).
They carried out extensive literature searches with quantitative methodologies designed to uncover evidence for chemical hormesis in previous
toxicology studies. After finding numerous studies containing U-shaped
dose-response curves, they concluded that chemical hormesis is a widely
generalizable phenomenon and that ‘‘the concept of hormesis (i.e., lowdose stimulation=high-dose inhibition) is counter to the cancer risk assessment practices by U.S. regulatory agencies’’ (1998, 4 and VIII-1).3
They note that government risk assessors use linear, no-threshold models
that predict harmful effects from carcinogens at all dose levels, whereas
Calabrese and Baldwin’s data suggests that carcinogens may be likely to
produce small beneficial effects at very low dose levels. In other words,
Calabrese and Baldwin considered the phenomenon of chemical hormesis
to be a serious anomaly that runs counter to the linear, no-threshold
scientific models currently used for carcinogen risk assessment by U.S.
governmental agencies.
The hormesis case is ideal for examining the reasoning by which
scientists probe the potential errors related to anomalous data, because
researchers have pointed out a variety of specific errors that might
have given rise to the anomalous relationship between Calabrese and
Baldwin’s data and current carcinogen dose-response models. (See, e.g.,
Davis and Svendsgaard 1990; Davis and Farland 1998; Elliot 2000a,
2000b; Menzie 2001.) These errors can be grouped under at least three
categories: (1) errors associated with the anomalous data itself, (2) errors
associated with Calabrese and Baldwin’s auxiliary hypotheses, and (3)
errors associated with current carcinogen dose-response models. The
elimination of errors in category (1) arguably constitutes what Darden
called anomaly ‘‘confirmation.’’ In other words, scientists ‘‘confirm’’ the
hormesis anomaly by showing that the anomalous data appear to be
justifiable. By probing for errors in categories (2) and (3), researchers are
‘‘localizing’’ the anomaly (i.e., identifying the particular auxiliary hypotheses, theories, or theory components that appear to be in error).
First, the anomalous data that Calabrese and Baldwin obtained in their
literature search might themselves be in error. For example, the U-shaped
dose-response curves that Calabrese and Baldwin have been studying
might be statistical artifacts; if toxicologists perform a very large number
of experiments, random statistical fluctuations in the data will result in a
few studies with U-shaped dose-response curves, even if all the dose3. For further support of the hormesis hypothesis, see Gerber, Williams, and Gray (1999),
who claim, ‘‘There can be no doubt about the reality of hormesis’’ (1999, 278).
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response relationships explored by the experiments are actually linear
(Davis and Svendsgaard 1990; Crump 2001). Or, these U-shaped doseresponse curves might be produced by a wide variety of confounding
factors, including interactive effects of different chemicals, multiple
effects of the same chemical on different endpoints, adaptive or compensatory mechanisms, and atypical responses to unique laboratory
conditions (Davis and Svendsgaard 1990, 75–77). U-shaped doseresponse curves produced by these confounding factors would be experimental artifacts or, at best, the effects of unique conditions that could
not be easily generalized to other circumstances. Finally, Elliot (2000b)
has suggested that hormesis researchers are employing a confused array
of different concepts of chemical hormesis. Therefore, there is a danger
that researchers such as Calabrese and Baldwin will inadvertently make
the error of concluding that experimental evidence supports the existence
of phenomena associated with many or all concepts of chemical hormesis,
even if experimental evidence supports only the existence of phenomena
associated with one particular concept of chemical hormesis, if any.
Second, even if the data that Calabrese and Baldwin have been
observing may be correct, they may be assuming erroneous auxiliary
hypotheses that falsely make this data appear to conflict with the linear,
no-threshold models used by government risk assessors. For example,
Calabrese and Baldwin have not observed any studies in which a carcinogenic chemical produces hormetic effects on an endpoint associated
with the entire process of carcinogenesis, such as cancer-related mortality.
Instead, they have observed studies in which carcinogenic chemicals
produce hormetic effects on endpoints associated with some aspect of
carcinogenesis, such as DNA repair enzyme activity or cell division.
Therefore, they must assume the auxiliary hypothesis that hormetic effects
on endpoints associated with some aspect of carcinogenesis will result in
hormetic effects on endpoints associated with the entire process of carcinogenesis. Calabrese and Baldwin must also accept the auxiliary hypotheses that hormetic effects observed during short-term studies will
remain over extended periods of time, that hormetic effects are not eliminated by the interactive effects of multiple toxic chemicals, that a dose
range exists at which both sensitive and non-sensitive members of the
population experience hormetic effects, and that humans are not already
exposed to dose levels that surpass the chemicals’ hormetic dose ranges
(Davis and Farland 1998, 380; Elliott 2000a, 185–192). If any of these
auxiliary hypotheses are false, then government risk assessors may be
justified in using no-threshold dose-response models even if hormetic
effects occur under some circumstances. Therefore, the anomalous relationship that Calabrese and Baldwin claim to exist between their hormetic
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data and the models used by U.S. government risk assessors may indicate
merely that Calabrese and Baldwin are employing erroneous auxiliary
hypotheses.
Finally, the anomalous data uncovered by Calabrese and Baldwin may
actually indicate that the no-threshold models used by government risk
assessors are in error. Even in this case, however, the linear, no-threshold
models might be afflicted by several different sorts of error, just as
Wimsatt (1987) points out that models can be false in a variety of ways.
The no-threshold models might fail under some conditions (e.g., on
particular endpoints or particular organisms or particular environmental
conditions) but provide accurate descriptions of cancer risk under other
conditions. Or, the models might simply fail to take account of some
important variables. For example, no-threshold models might provide
accurate predictions of cancer risk over long periods of time but provide
inaccurate predictions over short periods of time.
Because the hormesis case study illustrates such a wide variety of errors
that might be contributing to the hormesis anomaly, it supports the claim in
Section 2 that the initial stages of scientific discovery can be fruitfully
described as error-probing processes. ‘‘Confirmation’’ of the anomalous
hormesis data requires the elimination of numerous potential errors (e.g.,
statistical errors, experimental errors, and poorly described experimental
conditions) that might produce hormetic results as experimental artifacts.
Furthermore, ‘‘localization’’ of the anomaly within a particular theory
requires the identification and elimination of still other potential errors in
order to elucidate the precise theory that is at fault. For example, Calabrese
and Baldwin can ‘‘localize’’ the hormesis anomaly as a problem for theories of carcinogenesis only by showing that it is not erroneous to accept
particular auxiliary hypotheses (e.g., that hormetic effects on carcinogenic
endpoints provide evidence for hormetic effects on the entire process of
carcinogenesis). Thus, only after the hormesis anomaly has been extensively characterized (by probing for potential errors) are scientists ready to
begin altering former theories in response to it. Section 4 argues that this
description of discovery’s early stages as error-probing processes yields a
better understanding of the entire course of scientific discovery.
4. Three Lessons for Scientific Discovery. This section argues, based on
the hormesis case, that analyzing scientific discovery’s earliest stages as
error-probing processes yields a deeper understanding of the entire course
of discovery. First, it provides a better understanding of the challenges that
researchers face during the early stages of discovery. Second, it offers a
richer understanding of the reasoning strategies that one can employ during
those early stages. Third, it provides novel insights concerning the ways in
which those early stages can influence the ultimate course of discovery.
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4.1. The Challenges of Error Probing. First, the hormesis case illustrates the difficulties that scientists face as they probe anomalies for error
during the early stages of scientific discovery. For example, Darden and
Mayo have both emphasized performing further experimental tests as a
reasoning strategy for these early stages. Darden suggests that researchers
should repeat experiments in order to gain a better understanding of
anomalous results (1991, 271), and Mayo argues that experimentalists
should use error-statistical tests to evaluate the auxiliary hypotheses associated with anomalous data (1996, 147–148). The hormesis case
illustrates at least three problems with this strategy of performing experimental tests in order to probe for the errors associated with anomalous
results. These problems may not always be insuperable for the strategy of
experimental testing, but they do limit its effectiveness.
The first problem is that even though auxiliary hypotheses play a
crucial role in the experiments that yield anomalous data, many of these
hypotheses are very difficult to evaluate using experimental tests. (See,
e.g., Laudan 1997; Carrier 2001.) Therefore, the repetition of an experiment may help researchers to conclude that they did not make a one-time
experimental error, but this repetition may not help them to determine
whether all the auxiliary hypotheses associated with their experiment are
legitimate. Mayo suggests that experimentalists can subject these auxiliary hypotheses to separate severe tests, but the hormesis case illustrates
how difficult it can be to perform those experiments. To take one example,
researchers such as Calabrese and Baldwin need to evaluate the auxiliary
hypothesis that the U-shaped dose-response curves associated with particular experiments are not the result of unknown conditions that are
unique to those particular experimental setups. Unfortunately, researchers
may initially have very little idea what conditions might be involved in
the production of a U-shaped dose-response curve, which makes this
auxiliary hypothesis very difficult to evaluate. For example, some research suggests that hormetic effects are more likely to occur when
organisms are exposed to adverse environmental conditions (Calabrese
and Baldwin 1998, IV-3-4; Vichi and Tritton 1989). Similarly, hormetic
effects may be much more likely to occur on some endpoints as opposed
to other endpoints. Stebbling (1982, 1995) suggests that the endpoint of
growth in particular may be governed by a number of feedback loops that
are likely to produce overcompensation for the presence of small amounts
of substances that normally inhibit growth. Therefore, researchers might
find that a U-shaped, no-threshold dose-response curve consistently
occurs on the endpoint of growth, but it might occur much more sporadically, if at all, on an endpoint such as longevity. Still other conditions
to consider in the case of chemical hormesis include the organism type
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(e.g., plant, fungus, bacteria, mammal, human), the chemical type (e.g.,
metal salts, growth inhibitors, carcinogens), the length of exposure to the
chemical (e.g., a short period of time vs. an extended period of time), and
exposure to combinations of toxic chemicals. Scientists might not even
consider many of the other experimental conditions that could affect the
production of the hormetic effect. Therefore, researchers must develop
some understanding of the relevant variables that affect the production of
U-shaped dose-response curves before they can design effective experiments to evaluate the auxiliary hypothesis that the U-shaped doseresponse curve in a particular experiment is not the result of unique
experimental conditions.
The second problem with experimental testing as an error-probing
strategy is that researchers may not have a clear conception of what
phenomenon they are trying to test. Elliott (2000b) claims that hormesis
researchers employ at least seven distinct concepts of chemical hormesis,
so an adequate test for one concept of hormesis may not be an adequate
test for a different concept. For example, the hormesis dispute has been
plagued by questions about whether the phenomenon of ‘‘hormesis’’
should be characterized so that it includes any case in which low-dose
effects are the opposite of high-dose effects, whether it should include
only cases of low-dose stimulation and high-dose inhibition, or whether it
must be associated with a particular mechanism, such as overcompensation. If researchers cannot agree about precisely what chemical hormesis is, it is difficult for them to design an adequate severe test of the
hypothesis that hormesis occurs in a regular fashion.
Yet a third problem is practical. Because the positive hormetic effects
produced at low-dose levels are often quite small (130%-160% of the
control), it is very difficult to construct a severe test for the hormesis
hypothesis that also has sufficient statistical power to be likely to confirm
the presence of hormetic effects. Therefore, if one designs a test with a
small sample size, hormesis might occur, but the small effects characteristic of chemical hormesis would not be sufficiently different from controls
to be statistically significant (and thus to pass the test). The upshot is that
researchers must design a test with a very large number of organisms in
order to be likely to confirm the existence of chemical hormesis. Because
such tests are costly, researchers cannot obtain funding to perform them
unless they can provide preliminary evidence that hormesis is likely to
occur. The combination of these three problems makes it difficult for
researchers to settle the hormesis issue using experimental tests alone.
They cannot easily obtain funding for experimental tests until they have a
sufficiently clear conception of the phenomenon that they are trying to test
and until they know the conditions under which that phenomenon is likely
to occur. Unfortunately, this is exactly the sort of information that
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researchers who study anomalies may not initially have and that they are
often trying to obtain by performing the experimental tests (see also
Ashford and Miller 1998; Krimsky 2000).
4.2. Strategies for Probing Error. The primary value of the hormesis
case study is not, however, the fact that it points out difficulties in others’
strategies for probing the errors associated with anomaly. This case study
is particularly valuable because it suggests other strategies that are useful
for probing error, despite the difficulties just mentioned. Although these
strategies do appear to describe the approaches actually taken by
researchers in the hormesis case, and although they seem to have some
normative force as good approaches for other researchers to follow, the
strategies are probably most convincing when they are interpreted as
hypothetical rather than as normative or descriptive. Following Darden,
they are ‘‘hypotheses about strategies that could have produced the historical changes that did occur’’ or that may be producing the changes that
are presently occurring (1991, 15). Consider the following seven strategies: (a) reexamining previous studies of the anomalous phenomenon; (b)
looking for new variables that might be associated with the anomalous
results; (c) suggesting plausible mechanisms that might produce the
anomalous results; (d) relating the anomalous results to established theories; (e) explaining why earlier experiments failed to produce evidence
for the anomalous phenomenon; (f ) looking for evidence of the anomalous phenomenon under diverse conditions;4 and (g) using informal errorstatistical arguments in support of the anomalous phenomenon or the
auxiliary hypotheses used to test the phenomenon.
First, the hormesis case study illustrates the value of strategy (a), which
involves reexamining previous experimental studies of an anomalous
phenomenon. This strategy is, admittedly, closely related to Mayo’s and
Darden’s strategy of performing further experimental studies. Nevertheless, the strength of strategy (a) is that it involves examining multiple
previous studies, whereas one or two new studies might not provide
adequate information to probe successfully for error. Although Calabrese
and Baldwin have not performed further experiments of their own, their
fundamental approach to confirming the hormesis hypothesis involved the
collection and analysis of hundreds of previous studies. In many of these
previous experiments, researchers produced statistically significant evidence that low-level exposure of an organism to a chemical produced the
4. The conditions under which it is reasonable to look for an anomaly may be more or less
diverse, depending on how general a claim the anomaly challenges. Nevertheless, strategy
(f ) advocates looking for evidence of the anomalous phenomenon under as broad a range of
conditions as one could reasonably expect to find it.
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opposite of the effects produced by the chemical at higher dose levels
(Calabrese and Baldwin 1998). Most of the scientists who performed
these studies placed little significance on their results, perhaps because
they assumed that some experimental errors were vitiating their results or
causing them to obtain data that would not be generalizable to many other
cases. However, Calabrese and Baldwin’s identification of a large number
of such studies suggests that the theoretical models that conflict with these
results may themselves be in error rather than the experiments that produced the results. These data have enabled Calabrese and Baldwin to
support the anomalous hormesis hypothesis, despite the contrary scientific consensus against the occurrence of opposite effects of toxins at low
doses.
An example of strategy (b) (i.e., adding new variables) is that hormesis
researchers have argued that hormetic effects may make more sense when
they are examined over time. Starting in the early 1980’s, A. R. D. Stebbing
(1982, 1998) suggested that the hormesis anomaly might reveal that previous researchers made the error of underestimating the importance of time
as a variable in dose-response relationships. He suggested that chemical
hormesis might involve feedback processes that result in temporary
overcompensation for environmental stressors. In other words, Stebbing
suggested that, after a toxin is administered, a linear or threshold model is
likely to capture the relationship between the dose of the toxin and its
effect. He argued, however, that organisms’ defense mechanisms might
later ‘‘kick in’’ and overcompensate for the stressor (at low doses), thus
gradually changing the linear curve to a U-shaped dose-response curve for
a period of time. Finally, he suggested that the overcompensation response
might wear off after an extended period of time, thus returning the Ushaped dose-response curve to a linear or threshold curve (see Figure 2).
Stebbing’s suggested time-dependence of hormetic effects is particularly significant, because it suggests a plausible set of mechanisms
(namely, adaptive processes of overcompensation) that could explain
hormetic phenomena. This is an example of strategy (c). Calabrese and
Baldwin have suggested numerous other mechanisms that might also result in hormetic effects, including the removal or inactivation of enzyme
inhibitors, the simultaneous actions of inhibitors as substrates in other
reactions, dissociation of enzymes into active subunits, and alteration in
cell permeability (1998, VII-3-7). Furthermore, in accord with strategy
(d), Calabrese and Baldwin have attempted to associate hormetic effects
with the theory of evolution by natural selection. They once again cite the
work of Stebbing (1982), who argued that natural selection might have
favored organisms that developed generalized adaptive strategies of
mildly overcompensating for a variety of stressors (Calabrese and Baldwin

190

kevin elliott

Figure 2. Example of the temporal dependence of the dose-response relationships characteristic of ‘‘overcompensation hormesis.’’ Time 1 represents an initial period of inhibition at all dose levels. Time 2 illustrates the organism’s overcompensation to the toxin at
low doses. At time 3, the overcompensation effect has begun to subside).

1998, VII-15). All these strategies assist in ‘‘confirming’’ the anomaly (by
supporting the legitimacy of hormesis data) and ‘‘localizing’’ the anomaly
(by suggesting particular theories that may need to be changed in response
to the anomaly).
In accordance with strategy (e) (i.e., explaining why previous experiments failed to produce anomalous results), Calabrese and Baldwin
claimed that few previous studies of the effects of toxic chemicals examined the very low-dose effects of toxins. Because the toxicologists
designing the experiments were primarily concerned to find statistically
significant evidence that a toxic chemical produced harmful effects at high
doses, they did not bother to study low-dose effects (Calabrese and
Baldwin 1999). Therefore, Calabrese and Baldwin argued, in effect, that
most of these studies would not have been likely to display hormetic
effects even if hormesis were a generalizable phenomenon. Their argument contributes to ‘‘confirming’’ the hormesis anomaly, because it shows
that the lack of evidence for hormesis in the past should not be taken as
evidence that hormesis is a fluke result or experimental artifact.
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Calabrese and Baldwin also looked for evidence of hormesis under
diverse circumstances (strategy f ). A point that they emphasized in their
initial literature search and in subsequent publications was the diversity of
conditions under which hormetic effects have been observed:
Hormetic responses are observed in numerous species from a broad
range of taxonomic groups including microbes, plants, and animals
(including humans). . . . Chemicals shown to induce hormetic effects
represent a broad range of chemical classes: the most studied agents were
metals, followed by alcohols, antibiotics, auxin related compounds, and
numerous biocidal agents. . . . The types of hormetic responses indicate
that the principal endpoint studied has been growth, followed by metabolic/physiological changes (e.g., enzyme activity), longevity, and
various reproductive endpoints. (Calabrese and Baldwin 1998, 2)
This strategy makes perfect sense from an ‘‘error-probing’’ point of view.
In toxicological experiments, a U-shaped dose-response curve might
occasionally show up as an experimental artifact or as a fluke result.
However, it is very unlikely that an experimental artifact or fluke result
would show up in many different experiments, across a broad range of
taxonomic groups, with a broad array of chemicals, on a number of
biological endpoints. Thus, this example of strategy (f ) is also an example
of strategy (g); Calabrese and Baldwin are making an informal argument
that their literature search ‘‘confirms’’ the hormesis anomaly. They claim
that it would be exceedingly unlikely that toxicologists would have observed U-shaped dose-response curves under so many conditions if
hormesis were not a generalizable phenomenon.
4.3. How Error Probing Influences the Course of Discovery. Another
significant lesson to be drawn from the hormesis case is that the process
of error probing in discovery’s early stages can impact the ultimate course
of scientific discovery in a complex variety of ways. As a preliminary
attempt to begin understanding these impacts, this section identifies three
specific sorts of influence (to be called ‘‘persistence,’’ ‘‘identification,’’
and ‘‘strategy’’ influences) by which error probing seems to be influencing the course of discovery in the hormesis case. By identifying these
three impacts, the section extends the earlier work of Wimsatt and Darden
by clarifying the role of the early stages of scientific discovery in the
overall discovery process. As discussed in Section 2 of this paper,
Wimsatt did not explore the influences of the early stages of scientific
discovery (i.e., the stages of anomaly ‘‘confirmation’’ and ‘‘localization’’). Darden claimed that the early stages of scientific discovery affect
the later stages in at least two ways: (1) researchers do not alter former
theories until an anomaly is ‘‘confirmed’’ and ‘‘localized,’’ and (2)
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anomaly localization identifies particular components within a theory as
candidates for alteration. The persistence, identification, and strategy
influences constitute three further ways in which the early stages of scientific discovery influence the later ones. The persistence influence is a
further impact associated with the stage that Darden described as anomaly
confirmation, whereas the identification and strategy influences are further aspects of anomaly localization. In order to illustrate these influences
in the hormesis case, let us consider the time-scale error that Stebbing
proposed (i.e., that previous dose-response models erroneously assumed
that toxic effects do not change significantly over time).
The first way in which researchers’ probing for this ‘‘time-scale error’’
seems to have influenced scientific discovery might be called a ‘‘persistence’’ influence. This influence is that the plausibility of the time-scale
error seems to have made researchers more likely to ‘‘persist’’ in exploring ways to alter former models or theories in response to the
hormesis anomaly. Throughout the early decades of the twentieth century,
scientists frequently dismissed hormesis, claiming that it was probably
the result of errors associated with researchers’ experimental results
(Calabrese and Baldwin 2000a, 2000b). Thus, the hormesis anomaly did
not encourage them to explore alterations to their former theories. In
contrast, Stebbing’s proposed time-scale error is associated with former
dose-response models rather than with experimental results. By proposing
a way to explain the anomaly in terms of an error that is not related
to researchers’ experimental results, Stebbing has encouraged other
researchers to take hormetic results seriously. Therefore, they are now
more likely to explore ways to alter former theories or models. In sum, by
shifting researchers’ focus to a new locus of error (namely, dose-response
models and physiological theories of compensation to toxins), Stebbing
has affected the discovery process in the hormesis case by contributing to
a much greater persistence in scientists’ efforts to alter former models and
theories in response to the hormesis anomaly.
The second, ‘‘identification,’’ influence of the time-scale error is that it
has contributed to identifying plausible theories for researchers to modify in
response to the hormesis anomaly. Scientists are currently unsure to which
theory the hormesis anomaly relates. Thus, the hormesis anomaly provides
further evidence for the claim in Section 2 that Darden’s account of
anomaly localization could be extended to consider how researchers isolate
one particular theory to which an anomaly relates. For example, hormesis
might not be a problem for any general theory, if it is merely the result of
experimental errors. Alternatively, it could reflect an error associated with
physiological theories about how organisms compensate for exposure to
toxins and carcinogens. Or, the anomaly could indicate that toxicologists
have erroneously underestimated the diversity of physiological effects

error as means to discovery

193

produced by toxins. Because of this variety of theories that could be in
error, the present paper has treated hormesis as an anomaly not for a particular theory but rather for the dose-response models that predict harmful
or neutral effects from toxins and carcinogens at low doses. (Because these
models are based on a wide variety of theories from physiology, carcinogenesis, and experimental design, the paper has been able to remain agnostic about the particular theory that might ultimately need to be changed
in response to the hormesis anomaly.)5 The time-scale error contributes to
scientific discovery by identifying physiological theories about organisms’
responses to toxins as the ‘‘culprits’’ for the hormesis anomaly. In other
words, if the time-scale error is correct, current physiological theories have
underestimated the frequency and extent to which organisms overcompensate for environmental stressors. Thus, Stebbing’s proposal of the timescale error directs the future course of discovery by providing researchers
with plausible hypotheses for altering particular theories in response to the
anomaly.
Finally, the time-scale error in the hormesis case provides a third,
‘‘projects,’’ influence on scientific discovery. In other words, Stebbing’s
proposal of that particular error provides researchers with research
projects for gaining further insights about the hormesis phenomenon. In
response to the suggestion that hormesis might be the result of a timescale error, Calabrese established a research project of examining previous biological studies that measured toxic effects both at low doses and at
multiple points of time (Calabrese 2001). Based on the study, he hoped to
determine whether Stebbing’s proposed error was a plausible explanation
for most instances of the hormesis anomaly. Although Calabrese found
some evidence that hormesis is an overcompensation phenomenon, he
also found evidence that the toxins in other studies produced hormetic
effects by affecting different receptor subtypes at different concentrations.
Furthermore, he acknowledged that the mechanism of affecting different
receptor subtypes might sometimes produce hormetic effects immediately
(thus reflecting a different error than the time-scale error).6 As a result,
5. In the present paper, dose-response models are distinguished from theories on the basis of
the models’ lack of explanatory detail. In other words, toxicologists’ dose-response models
(such as the linear-no-threshold model described in Section 3) provide rough predictions of
toxins’ effects while abstracting from the theoretical details of the mechanisms by which the
chemicals produce those effects.Therefore, researchers could conclude that a dose-response
model is probably erroneous while being quite unsure about the specific mechanisms (and thus
the theories) that are problematic.
6. The immediacy of hormetic effects is a somewhat relative notion. Although there is bound
to be some ‘‘lag time’’ between the administration of a toxin and the occurrence of its effects,
Calabrese found that the stimulatory effects in some studies could be labelled ‘‘immediate’’ in
the sense that they did not follow an initial period of inhibition produced by the toxin.
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Calabrese seems to have altered his characterization of the hormesis
anomaly. Whereas he suggested earlier that it might be possible to provide
a unified characterization of the anomaly as an overcompensation phenomenon (1999), he has suggested in some of his most recent work that
the anomaly may involve different types of mechanisms that produce
similar phenomena but that occur in different physiological systems in
response to different toxins (Calabrese and Baldwin 2002). Thus, even
though the time-scale error may not be the only error associated with the
hormesis phenomenon, it suggested a promising research project (i.e.,
examining the temporal effects of toxins) that has driven the discovery
process forward.
5. Conclusions. This paper has argued that scientific discovery’s early
stages can be described as error-probing processes and that this description yields greater understanding of the entire discovery process. The
paper’s second section argued that one could provide an improved description of scientific discovery’s early stages by characterizing them as
processes for probing the specific errors that might be associated with
scientific anomalies. The paper then supported this suggestion by showing how researchers are characterizing the contemporary biological
anomaly of chemical hormesis by probing for the errors associated with it.
Finally, the paper used the case study to show that this description of
scientific discovery’s early stages elucidates the challenges, research
strategies, and influences associated with those stages.
Although the paper has focused on a case study from the biological
sciences (i.e., chemical hormesis), it is plausible that its analysis could
apply to a range of other scientific disciplines. For example, many of the
errors that Section 2 identified as important ones for researchers to investigate in the early stages of the discovery process appear to be at least
as relevant in the physical sciences as in the biological sciences. For
example, Hacking (1983), Galison (1987), Collins and Pinch (1993), and
Mayo (1996) have provided numerous illustrations of how researchers in
the physical sciences must eliminate potential errors in their statistical
interpretations of data, test experimental instrumentation, eliminate experimental artifacts, and distinguish fluke results from reliable ones. The
authors’ studies also illustrate many ways in which researchers in the
physical sciences ‘‘localize’’ anomalies by probing auxiliary hypotheses
for error before they assign blame to primary theories. To provide just one
example, both Galison (1987) and Mayo (1996) describe how physicists
investigating the anomalous phenomenon of neutral currents developed
computer simulation models and performed detailed statistical analyses in
order to determine whether auxiliary hypotheses concerning their experimental setup were free from significant errors. Therefore, it is plausible
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that philosophers could gain increased understanding of the discovery
process throughout a wide range of sciences by examining the role of
error probing in the early stages of discovery.
By using recent studies of error to expand and elucidate previous
philosophical investigations of scientific discovery, this paper makes at
least three contributions to the philosophy of science. First, it extends
previous work on error (e.g., Hon 1989; Mayo 1996; Allchin 2001). It
clarifies weaknesses of experimental testing as a strategy for probing
error, and it identifies a variety of alternative strategies for error probing.
Second, it strengthens the literature on scientific discovery. It argues that
the early stages of discovery can be described as an extended errorprobing process by which researchers characterize anomalies. It shows
that researchers can employ a variety of strategies for investigating
anomalies during these stages. And, it elucidates ‘‘persistence,’’ ‘‘identification,’’ and ‘‘project’’ influences by which the early stages of discovery impact the rest of the discovery process. Third, the paper
contributes to a unification of current science studies by bringing together
traditional philosophical work on scientific discovery with the work of the
‘‘new experimentalists.’’ Thus, the paper illustrates that the literature on
scientific discovery constitutes yet another locus at which recent studies
of scientific experimentation can impact the philosophy of science.
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